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Abstract
This paper develops a growth model aimed at understanding the eﬀects of globalization of
production on rate of innovation, distribution of labor income between the North and South
and welfare of workers in both regions. We adopt a dynamic general equilibrium product-
cycle model, assuming that the North specializes in innovation and the South specializes
in imitation. Globalization of production resulting from trade liberalization and imitation
of the North’s technology by the South increases the rate of innovation. When the South’s
participation in the product cycle is not too deep, further deepening of globalization of
production lowers the wage of Southern labor relative to that of its counterpart in the
North. This poses a technology transfer paradox similar to that discovered by Jones and
Ruﬃn (forthcoming, JIE): an increase in the uncompensated technology transfer from the
North to the South makes the North better oﬀ. However, a point will be reached where
further deepening of globalization leads to increases in relative wage of the South. For
this reason, the North would eventually lose from uncompensated technology transfer as
globalization deepens.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
One of the most remarkable developments in international trade in the last thirty years was the
globalization of production of diﬀerentiated manufactured goods. Diﬀerentiated manufactured
goods can be broadly deﬁned as ones that emerged as a result of modern technology such as the
invention of electricity as well as computer-related technology. Examples are color TV, refrigerators
and microcomputers. These are technologically distinct from traditional goods that emerged before
the twentieth century, such as textile, paper and iron and steel. The diﬀerentiated goods were
almost all originally developed by the advanced industrialized countries (North). Until about three
decades ago, they were still mostly produced by the North. However, trade liberalization, policy
changes in the South as well as technological advancement in telecommunications led to the transfer
of production of some of these diﬀerentiated goods to the less developed countries (South) because
labor costs are much lower there. We call this transfer of production of diﬀerentiated goods from
the North to the South globalization of production.
Table 1 illustrates the globalization of production clearly. It shows that China’s output of ma-
jor industrial products increased dramatically from 1978 (beginning of reform by Deng Xiaoping)
to 2005. Note however that the magnitudes of increase are much higher for diﬀerentiated goods,
such as room air conditioners, refrigerators, color TV, microcomputers, mobile phones and inte-
grated circuits. This, we argue, reﬂects the globalization of production of diﬀerentiated goods we
mentioned above. We are interested in the impacts of such globalization of production on global
growth, income distribution and living standards in the North and the South.1
International technology diﬀusion and trade of diﬀerentiated manufactured goods between the
North and the South is well-captured by Raymond Vernon’s (1966) “product cycle” theory. Ac-
cording to Vernon, new products are usually developed in the most advanced countries (such as the
U.S. in the 1960s). During the initial period, production is located where the product is developed,
so as to allow eﬃcient feedback between R&D and production. When the production design, pro-
duction process and inputs become suﬃciently standardized, the technology will be transferred to
lower-wage countries. If we apply this theory to analyze the interaction between the technologically
more advanced economies such as the US and Europe and the less developed economies (LDCs)
1T h et i m ep a t ho fe x p o r t so fd i ﬀerentiated goods from China follows a similar pattern. For example, the number
of units exported in 2000 divided by the number of units exported in 1987 for air conditioning machines is 833. The
number of units exported in 2000 divided by the number of units exported in 1984 for household laundry equipment
and color TV are, respectively, 195 and 189. In value terms, the value exported in 2000 divided by the value exported
in 1985 for air conditioning machines and color TV are, respectively, 555 and 724.
1such as China and India, we can understand better how the increased participation of these LDCs
in the globalization of production aﬀects growth, labor income distribution between the North and
the South and living standard of workers in these regions. Therefore, in this paper, we adopt the
product cycle framework for our analysis. We assume that technology always originates from the
North and then diﬀuses from the North to the South through costly imitation by Southern ﬁrms.
We ask: Who gain and who lose from this on-going drama of innovation and imitation? Among
our ﬁndings is that there is a technology transfer paradox similar to the one discovered by Jones
and Ruﬃn (forthcoming).2 The paradox is that an increase in the extent of uncompensated tech-
nology transfer from the North to the South makes the North better oﬀ regardless of the North’s
preferences.
Jones and Ruﬃn (forthcoming) found that in a two-country multi-good static Ricardian world
where the high-wage country (North) has superior technology in all goods over a low-wage country
(South), the former can actually gain from an uncompensated transfer of its best technology to
the latter, provided that the countries share the same Cobb-Douglas preferences, and the relative
country size falls within a certain range. More paradoxically, this occurs when the original best
industry in the high-wage country is completely wiped out. The original best sector turns from being
an export good with no foreign production to being an import good with no domestic production.
Thus, drastic change in comparative advantage can beneﬁt a country. In this paper, we adopt
a dynamic general equilibrium product cycle model with on-going innovation and uncompensated
technology transfer (i.e. imitation) from the high-wage country to the low-wage country. Like Jones
and Ruﬃn, whenever a good is imitated by the South, it ceases to be produced by the North, and
the North turns from an exporter to an importer of the good. Country sizes can matter too, as our
paradox occurs only when the labor supply in the South is suﬃciently small compared with that
of the North.
One stimulation for this line of research on how North-South technology transfer aﬀects relative
wage and welfare of the North and South is from Samuelson (2004). Using a Ricardian model, he
argued that as the South’s comparative advantage changes so that it begins to export the goods
that the North used to have comparative advantage in, then as the South’s productivity in these
goods improve, at some point the North is going to suﬀer permanent loss from free trade. His main
point is to give an example whereby free trade globalization can be harmful to the North. Along
similar vein, Gomory and Baumol (2000) argued that, under free trade, while the North gains by
helping a very underdeveloped South (which has few industries) to acquire technologies of new
industries and improve productivity, it loses when the South acquires the technologies of too many
new industries. Their model is quite diﬀerent from ours in the sense that they emphasize economies
2Similar but less striking ﬁndings are found in Beladi, Jones and Marjit (1997), Kemp and Shimomura (1988) and
Ruﬃn and Jones (2007), which is a two-commodity version of Jones and Ruﬃn (forthcoming).
2of scale and the existence of multiple equilibria. Nonetheless, there is an interesting similarity with
this paper: In this paper, we also ﬁnd that the North unambiguously gains from uncompensated
technology transfer to the South when the South has so far acquired relatively smaller fraction
of new industries, but the North will lose from that when the South has already acquired a large
fraction of new industries.
Krugman (1979) was among the ﬁrst to develop a dynamic general equilibrium model of the
North-South product cycle to study the eﬀects of policies on distribution of labor income and
technological gap between the North and the South. Assuming that innovation takes the form of
expansion of product variety, and that rate of product innovation and rate of production transfer
from the North to the South are autonomous, he shows that an increase in the rate of (uncompen-
sated) production transfer raises the relativew a g eo ft h eS o u t h .( I nf a c t ,t h eN o r t hm a yb eh u r t
as a result.) Thus, there is no technology transfer paradox as mentioned above.3 Dollar (1986)
introduces capital and capital mobility in a Krugman-type model and arrives at similar conclusions.
Grossman and Helpman (1991b) analyze the product cycle by means of an expanding-variety-
type innovation-driven endogenous growth model in which the rate of product innovation and rate
of imitation are endogenized. They assume Northern ﬁrms engage in costly product innovation and
Southern ﬁrms engage in costly imitation of North-developed products. They ﬁnd that an increase
in the extent of uncompensated technology transfer to the South resulting from an increase in the
supply of labor in the South raises its relative wage. Like Krugman, an increase in technology
transfer makes the South better oﬀ, and may or may not hurt the North.4 Again, there is no
technology transfer paradox. Glass and Saggi (2001) study outsourcing from the North to the
South in a quality-ladder product cycle model similar to that of Grossman and Helpman (1991a),
and they ﬁnd that changes that result in faster rate of outsourcing always reduce the relative wage
of the North. Yet, what they focus on is compensated technology transfer through outsourcing.
We are interested in understanding the eﬀects of increased participation of the South in global
production, which is caused by trade liberalization followed by increases in the supply of Southern
3An increase in South’s labor supply raises the relative wage of the North in Krugman’s model. However, it does
not constitute an increase in the extent of uncompensated technology transfer as the rate of technology transfer stays
the same.
4In another paper, which features a “quality-ladder” innovation-driven growth model, Grossman and Helpman
(1991a) analyze a more complex pattern of innovation and imitation. The “ineﬃcient follower” case in their model
yields similar results as in Grossman and Helpman (1991b). The “eﬃcient follower” case generates a number of
ambiguous results, including ambiguous eﬀect of labor supply on the relative wage of a country.
In Segerstrom, Anant and Dinopoulos’s (1990) product cycle model, innovation also takes the form of quality
improvement in the North. Technology is transferred to the South through costless imitation, and the length of the
product cycle (imitation lag) is exogenous. Since there is no R&D sector in the South, an increase in Southern labor
supply lowers the relative wage of the South whenever the relative wage diﬀers from one.
3labor (technicians and engineers, who can work in either production or imitation activity) partici-
pating in the product cycle. Here is the background of our model. The economies of the North and
the South each consists of an agricultural sector and a manufacturing sector. The manufacturing
sector of each country consists of a traditional good and possibly some diﬀerentiated goods. We as-
sume that all diﬀerentiated goods are developed by the North. Before trade liberalization between
the North and South, we assume that trade barriers were prohibitive. Having no trade with the
North, the South did not know how to produce the diﬀerentiated goods. Therefore, no Southern
labor was involved in production of diﬀerentiated goods. Hence, before trade liberalization, the
South’s manufacturing sector consists of the traditional good only. With no trade between the
two regions, Northern ﬁrms produced the agricultural good, the traditional good and diﬀerenti-
ated goods and sold to the North only, while Southern ﬁrms produced the agricultural good, and
the traditional good and sold to the South only. However, we do not model the agricultural and
traditional good sectors in this paper for simplicity.
Immediately after trade liberalization, the North exports diﬀerentiated goods to the South while
the South exports agricultural and traditional good to North. After the North exports diﬀerentiated
goods to the South, the latter eventually learns to imitate and produce some of them. In steady
state equilibrium, Southern ﬁrms imitate some but not all of the diﬀerentiated goods, produce
them and sell them to both the South and the North. In steady state equilibrium, there is trade
in agricultural and traditional goods, but we do not model them in this paper for simplicity.
No Southern workers were involved in the production of diﬀerentiated goods before trade lib-
eralization because no Southern ﬁrms had exposure to Northern technology. But even after trade
liberalization, and the South imitates some diﬀerentiated goods, the extent of globalization of pro-
duction is limited by the supply of workers in the South. The supply is limited possibly because of
limited labor mobility between rural and urban areas, and shortage of competent, skilled workers.
As the South develops more, the supply of Southern labor increases.
We are interested in understanding the eﬀects of (i) trade liberalization, which is equivalent
to a transition from autarky equilibrium to free trade equilibrium for a given Southern supply of
labor; (ii) an increase in South’s labor supply, leading to increased imitation of Northern goods.
We shall call this second, more gradual, transition the deepening of globalization of production.
We ﬁrst compare the autarky equilibrium with the free trade equilibrium keeping the supply
of Southern labor LS constant. This captures the trade liberalization stage of globalization of
production. Then, assuming that there is free trade, we analyze the eﬀects of changes in LS on
the rate of innovation, rate of imitation, income distribution between workers in the two regions,
and welfare of labor in the two regions. This captures the deepening of globalization of produc-
tion. The model we develop is an endogenous product cycle model inspired by Grossman and
4Helpman (1991b). One important innovation in this paper is that the time it takes to imitate a
product is assumed to depend negatively on the quantity of resources devoted to imitation. This
assumption is justiﬁed by the observation that the longer it takes, the less resources are required to
reverse-engineer a technology and to adapt it to a new environment. See, for example, Mansﬁeld,
Schwartz and Wagner (1981), Mansﬁeld (1982), and Teece (1976, 1977).5 It will be seen that the
incorporation of such an essential characteristic of the imitation cost function would have crucial
impacts on comparative steady-states results. In particular, it gives rise to the “technology transfer
paradox” similar to that discovered by Jones and Ruﬃn (forthcoming), and non-monotonic eﬀects
of globalization of production on Northern and Southern welfare.
Here are our ﬁndings. First, globalization of production resulting from trade liberalization and
imitation of Northern technology by the South would increase growth of the North. Second, with
free trade, when the South learns to imitate faster, it leads to higher rate of innovation, higher rate
of imitation and higher wage of Southern labor relative to that of the North, given that the labor
is essential for both production and research in each country. Third, the labor requirement for
imitating a product is higher, the larger is LS. This has interesting consequence: As globalization
of production deepens after trade liberalization, while the Southern supply of labor is still relatively
small, an increase in Southern labor supply will lower the wage of the South relative to that of the
North. This implies that an increase in the extent of uncompensated technology transfer from the
North to the South makes the North better oﬀ in the initial stage of globalization of production,
because growth becomes faster and the North’s relative wage rises as globalization deepens. This
poses a technology transfer paradox: Although the North is uncompensated for the technology
transfers to the South, it is better oﬀ as a result of such transfers.
Eventually, however, as the labor supply in the South becomes suﬃciently large, the relative
wage of its labor increases as globalization of production deepens. For this reason, the North would
eventually lose from increases in the extent of uncompensated technology transfer in the later stage
of globalization. The key factor in determining the direction of the eﬀect of LS on relative wage
is whether the (endogenous) increase in quantity of labor allocated to production dominates the
(endogenous) increase in demand for labor in production. When LS is small, the former eﬀect
dominates the latter. When LS is suﬃciently large, the reverse is true.
In Section 2, we lay down the main body of the imitation model. In Section 3, we solve for the
steady-state equilibrium, and in Section 4 we carry out comparative steady-state analyses. Section
5Although Teece (1976a) says that some ﬁrms found that, ex-post, the cost of imitation actually increases with the
time it takes to imitate (presumably when there are uncertainties in the time-cost relationship), Mansﬁeld, Schwartz
and Wagner (1981) provide evidence of a signiﬁcantly negative relationship between imitation cost and time to imitate.
We think the latter result makes sense when uncertainties are small. In our model, there are no uncertainties, and
therefore a time-cost trade-oﬀ is fully justiﬁed.
55 concludes with a discussion on the caveats of the model.
2 The Imitation Model
We shall tell the story backwards. In this section and the next, we assume that trade liberalization
(or globalization of production) has already taken place, and there is free trade in the world. We
ask how the world equilibrium is aﬀected as globalization deepens. In section 4, we compute the
autarky equilibrium in the North and compare the autarky and free trade equilibria.
So, in sections 2 and 3, we consider a two-country world economy in which, in equilibrium,
the North is the sole source of innovation and the other country, the South, only imitates goods
from the North. In each country, there is a single factor input, which can be used to undertake
three possible types of activities: innovation (product development), imitation (reverse engineering
of developed products), and production of goods. For convenience of exposition, we shall call this
factor input skilled labor, or simply labor. Innovation takes the form of development of a new
variety of the diﬀerentiated good. Potentially, there is an inﬁnite number of goods that can be
developed, but at any given time, only a ﬁnite number of goods has been developed. Production
technology is constant returns to scale and labor is the only factor of production. We assume that
the unit labor requirement for production for an imitator ﬁrm is the same as for the innovator ﬁrm
once the technology is imitated.
In explaining the model, we shall again tell the story backwards. We ﬁrst assume that goods
are continuously being developed, and consumers have perfect foresight about the number of goods
available at each date. They are oﬀered the price of each variety at each date. Consumer utility
maximization determines the demand function of each variety. Then we explain how prices of goods
are chosen by proﬁt-maximizing producers given the producers’ perfect foresight of consumers’
demands. Next, we introduce the cost functions of innovation and imitation. Potential innovators
and imitators decide whether or not to enter into the market. Free entry implies that, in equilibrium,
all innovators and imitators earn zero economic proﬁt. Thus, the equilibrium balanced growth rate
is determined.
2.1 The Demand for goods
Following Grossman and Helpman (1991b), we assume that a representative agent in the economy
(or, alternatively, one representative agent in each country in a two country world) chooses the time
path of instantaneous expenditure E(t) and instantaneous consumption x(z) of good z ∈ [0,n(t)]











e−r(τ−t)I(τ)dτ + A(t) for all t (2)








where 0 <α<1; n(t) denotes the most recently-developed good in the world at time t; ρ =t i m e
rate of preference; r = interest rate ; U(τ) = instantaneous utility at time τ ; I(τ) = instantaneous
income at τ ; A(t) = value of assets at t.I ne a c hp e r i o dτ, the agent takes A(τ), I(τ), r and prices
o fg o o d sa sg i v e n .
The dynamic optimization problem speciﬁed by (1), (2) and (3) can be broken down into an
intra-temporal optimization problem at time t of choosing x(z)( f o rg i v e nn(t)) to maximize U(t)
subject to the instantaneous budget constraint, and the intertemporal optimization problem of
c h o o s i n gat i m ep a t ho fE(t) to maximize W subject to the demand function of x(z) (determined
by intra-temporal optimization on the demand side) and the prices of goods p(z) (determined by
intra-temporal optimization on the supply side).
The intra-temporal consumer optimization problem is
max
x(z)
U(t)s . t .
Z n(t)
0
x(z)p(z)dz = E(t)( 4 )
The intertemporal optimization problem will be solved after we have solved the instantaneous
problems on the demand side and the supply side. Hereinafter, we drop the time argument t for
convenience, unless otherwise stated.
From the ﬁrst order condition of the maximization problem (4), and some simple manipulation,










1−σ dτ, where (1) is a special case as σ → 1l e a d st ot h e
same qualitative conclusion.
7The ‘ﬂow’ version of this ‘stock’ equation is I(t) − E(t)+rA(t)= ˙ A(t).
8Alternatively, U(τ) can be regarded as quantity of ﬁnal goods produced from a set of intermediate goods, with
production function (3).
7where   = 1
1−α > 1a n d0≤ α ≤ 1. The parameter   = 1
1−α is the elasticity of substitution between
any two goods. The greater α is, the greater is  , and the less is the love of variety.
2.2 The supply of goods
We assume constant returns to scale in production of each good. The only ﬁxed costs are the costs
of innovation and imitation.
We assume that each good is produced by a diﬀerent ﬁrm and that ﬁrms compete with each
other by setting prices. The market structure is one of monopolistic competition and each ﬁrm has
certain market power over the submarket of its good. During the production stage, due to the time
separability of the intertemporal proﬁts function, each ﬁrm chooses its price, given the prices of




π(z)=x(z){p(z) − c(z)} (6)
s.t. the demand function (5), where c(z) is the unit production cost of good z.
Ignoring the eﬀects of any single producer on the denominator of demand function (5), we








given the assumption that the unit labor requirement for production is equal to one for all good z,
i.e. c(z)=w,w h e r ew = wage rate.
Using the results of the intra-temporal optimization problem, the ﬁrst order condition for the
intertemporal optimization is:
r = ρ +
˙ E
E
The above equation states that growth rate of E will be higher when consumers are less impatient
(more willing to invest in the future), for any given r.W ed e ﬁne ˙ n
n ≡ g in the steady state, and
normalize by setting the price of a new ﬁrm (or the value of a new blueprint) equal to a constant
i na l lp e r i o d s ,i . e .
˙ E
E = ˙ n
n. We can then re-write the above equation as
r = ρ + g (8)
2.3 A Two-country World
To analyze the two-country world, we introduce the following notation. Among the n goods existing
in the world at time t, goods 0 to nS are produced by the South (after they have been imitated
8from the North), and the rest are produced by the North. Because of symmetry of all goods in
the demand function, xN stands for the demand for any good produced by a Northern ﬁrm, while
xS stands for the demand for any good produced by a Southern imitator. The variables xN and
xS are determined by demand function (5) when the prices of the n goods are known. Because
transportation cost is zero and there are no trade barriers, the producer of a good always sells to
the world market. Let πN be the instantaneous proﬁt of a Northern ﬁrm, and πS be that of a
Southern imitator ﬁrm. Wage rates in North and South are denoted by wN and wS respectively.
The supplies of labor in South and in North are assumed to be exogenous, denoted by LS and LN
respectively.
On the balanced growth path that we analyze, the steady state is characterized by g ≡ ˙ n
n =
˙ nS
nS = ˙ wN







EN ,s ot h a twN,w S , E, ES, EN, n and nS are in constant ratio
with each other over time. Here, E = ES +EN,w h e r eE, ES and EN are aggregate instantaneous
consumption expenditure in the world, the South and the North respectively. It can be deduced
from (5) to (7) and symmetry of all x(z) in the utility function that in the steady state, πN and πS
are constant over time. Note that the growth rate of utility is proportional to g.9
We assume that only the Northern ﬁrms innovate and only the Southern ﬁrms imitate in steady
state equilibrium. In equilibrium, a Northern ﬁrm develops a good by incurring an up-front cost,
and then earns the opportunity to make a constant stream of proﬁts at each date in future until
the good is imitated. Later in the product’s life, a Southern ﬁrm would ﬁnd it proﬁtable to invest
to imitate or reverse-engineer the product. Once a product is imitated by the South, its production
location will be shifted there forever.
Before its good is imitated, a Northern innovator-producer ﬁrm prices according to (7), so that





However, there are two pricing rules of a Southern ﬁrm after it imitates a good, according to
whether, in equilibrium, the gap between wN and wS is large or small, as shown below.
(a) Wide-gap Case
If wS
α <w N,i . e .wS <α w N, then the unconstrained monopoly proﬁt-maximizing price level of
a Southern imitator ﬁrm is less than the cost of the Northern innovator, and therefore, under the
assumption of price competition, the Nash equilibrium would be one at which the Southern ﬁrm






E = g, and (5), (9) and (10), we obtain the world







Therefore, the rate of innovation is an indicator of the growth of welfare in both countries.







α >w N,i . e .wS >α w N, then price competition between the Northern innovator and the
Southern imitator would drive the Nash equilibrium price level to slightly below the cost of the
high-cost ﬁrm, viz. pS = wN.
Only the wide-gap case will be discussed in this paper, since all results are qualitatively the
same in the narrow-gap case, as evident in the work of Grossman and Helpman (1991b).







2.3.1 Imitation Activity in the South
We assume, as in Romer (1990), that the knowledge stock in South lowers the cost of imitation. We
also assume that the relevant knowledge stock for imitating good z is the knowledge stock in the
South at the time the product z is developed td. To imitate a product, an imitator hires workers
to work at date td, and expects the imitation to be completed at date t. We assume that there is
a negative relationship between the labor devoted to imitation and t − td. Speciﬁc a l l y ,t h ec o s to f




]e−λ(t−td) assuming that λ>ρ+ g, (12)
where b is a parameter; t−td is the time it takes to imitate good z; λ is the exogenous rate of decline
of labor requirement for imitation with respect to the time it takes to imitate (it increases with
learning capability of Southern ﬁrms); KS(td) is the knowledge stock at date td, which the imitator
treats as given. To obtain a steady state consistent with constant allocations of resource in both
regimes, we use nS(t) to proxy for the knowledge stock in the South at time t,i . e .KS(t)=nS(t),∀t.
The above imitation cost function indicates that the unit labor requirement for imitation is
composed of the product of two parts: (i) 1/nS(td), which is inversely related to the cumulative ex-
perience of imitation in the South at the time when the product was developed; and (ii) be−λ(t−td),
which decreases exponentially with the time it takes to imitate. The ﬁrst term captures the knowl-
edge spillovers from previous imitational R&D (See, for example, Grossman and Helpman, 1991b
10and Romer, 1990). Mansﬁeld, Schwartz and Wagner (1981) give some evidence about the negative
relationship between cost of imitation and the time to imitate, which is consistent with the second
term above.
A c c o r d i n gt o( 1 2 ) ,s i n c ewS(td)/nS(td) is predetermined at td, and it is a constant in steady
state, imitation cost decreases with the time it takes to imitate at an exponential rate of λ>0,
while (11) implies that the present discounted value (PDV) of proﬁts derived from an imitated
product decreases at an exponential rate of r. It follows that as long as λ>rt h e r ew i l lb eat i m e
at which it becomes proﬁtable for a Southern ﬁrm to imitate from a Northern ﬁrm, as shown on
Figure 1. As will be elaborated later, free entry ensures that proﬁts are equal to zero.10
2.3.2 Innovation activity of the North
We assume that innovation is completed immediately after resources are devoted to it. This is
an innocuous assumption since our analysis focusses on changes in Southern supply of labor and
imitation capability. The cost of each act of innovation (product development) by a Northern ﬁrm





where a is a parameter, K(td) is the knowledge stock at date td when innovation takes place, and
1/K(td) captures the knowledge spillovers from previous product development in the North in the
spirit discussed in subsection 2.3.1. To obtain a steady state, we again proxy the knowledge stock
in the North at date t by n(t), i.e. K(t)=n(t),∀t.
2.3.3 Proﬁts to Northern Innovators and Southern Imitators
Let VN be the PDV of future proﬁts that can be earned by a Northern innovator (for a product
developed at time t) when no imitation will ever take place. Recall that πN is the instantaneous







Let VS be the PDV of proﬁts of a Southern imitator (for a product imitated at time t) and
10There is time-cost trade-oﬀ only when λ>rsince only then will the decline in labor requirement in imitation
be faster than the decline in PDV of proﬁts from imitation. Therefore, the condition is a necessary condition
















so that the PDV of proﬁts from imitation is lower than cost of imitation at the date the
product is developed.







Let tS be the equilibrium imitation date of a good that is developed at date td. It follows that
the index of this good is exactly nS at time tS. It can be easily shown that in steady state, when
˙ n





= e−g(tS−td) = e−gT (14)
where T ≡ tS − td is the equilibrium length of the product cycle. There are several interpretations
of the variable ξ in steady state: ﬁrst, ξ represents the equilibrium fraction of products produced in
the South in steady state; second, ξ can also be regarded as the (inverse) technological gap between










g at any date. (15)
The component ξ
λ
g i st h ep a r to ft h ei m i t a t i o nc o s tt h a ta c c o u n t sf o rt h et i m e - c o s tt r a d e - o ﬀ in
imitation.
2.4 Zero Proﬁt Conditions for Firms
Free entry implies that no ﬁrms can make any positive net proﬁt, properly discounted. This implies
that, for the Southern ﬁrm, the PDV of proﬁts equals the cost of imitation in equilibrium:
πS
r






Moreover, free entry without barriers ensures that the PDV of proﬁts of the Northern innovator
is equal to the cost of innovation. The proﬁt of the Northern ﬁrm, however, does not last forever.
It ends when the product is imitated. The PDV of this loss is equal to VNe−r(tS−td) = VNξ
r
g.











11By deﬁnition, nS (tS)=n(td)=n0e
g(td−t0) and n(tS)=n0e
g(tS−t0), where n0 is the value of n at time t0.T h i s
implies that ξ =
nS(tS)
n(tS) = e










g is the discount factor used to compare proﬁts at the time of imitation with proﬁt sa tt h et i m eo f
innovation.
122.5 Labor Market Clearing Conditions
Labor in each country is allocated endogenously between production and either product devel-














































n(1−ξ) is the instantaneous production labor input for a good produced in the North. In
other words, the instantaneous proﬁt of a good produced in the North is simply a mark-up factor
1−α
α times the instantaneous wage bill of production labor allocated to that good.














nS is the instantaneous production labor input for a South-produced good.
Now, deﬁne Ld = Labor devoted to product development in the North. Therefore, Ld+L
p
N = LN.
Equation (13) implies that Ld = a ˙ n
n = ag, which implies that
L
p
N = LN − ag (20)
Similarly, according to (15), labor devoted to imitation in the South is




g.S i n c eLi + L
p
S = LS,w eh a v e
L
p




The model is now fully characterized by the following equations: equation (8) is the interest rate-
growth rate relationship; (16) and (17) are the zero proﬁt conditions for the ﬁrms; (18) and (19)
represent instantaneous proﬁts of these ﬁrms as ﬁxed mark-ups of instantaneous production costs;
(20) and (21) are labor market clearing conditions in the North and South respectively.
133.1 Rate of innovation and technological gap
To solve the system of simultaneous equations, we reduce it to a system of two equations and two
unknowns involving g and ξ. Using (20), we can substitute for L
p
N in (18). Using the resulting



















and, as mentioned before,
LN−ag
n(1−ξ) is the instantaneous production labor input of a Northern-
produced good. The above equation is a zero proﬁt condition for a Northern innovator. The
left hand side (LHS) is the PDV of the stream of the instantaneous proﬁts of a product developed
in the North, taking into account the fact that the stream of proﬁts will terminate upon imitation
by multiplying by 1−ξ
r








instantaneous proﬁte x p r e s s e da saﬁxed mark-up of instantaneous production cost. The right hand
side (RHS) is the innovation cost. Note that wN
n can be canceled from both sides of the equation,
meaning that changes in wN and n have no eﬀect on the reduced form equilibrium relationship
between g and ξ in the North. Invoking equation (8), we obtain the reduced form ‘no-arbitrage










=( ρ + g) (22)
where hN ≡ LN









1−ξ . It can be shown in the Appendix that
df
dξ > 0. We can easily
see that
df
dg < 0. In other words, the LHS of the above equation increases with ξ but decreases
with g, while the RHS increases with g. By the implicit function theorem, therefore, it is clear that
equation (22) represents an upward sloping curve NN in the (g,ξ)s p a c e ,a ss h o w ni nF i g u r e2 .
Therefore, the Northern no-arbitrage condition shows a positive relation between g and ξ.
It might seem counter-intuitive that the rate of innovation increases despite an increase in the
rate of imitation. This is true because there are two opposing forces in action : (a) for a given n,
ag r e a t e rξ leads to fewer goods produced in the North, increasing the proﬁt rate of each Northern
ﬁrm at each date; and (b) a greater ξ means higher rate of capital loss to the innovator due to the
faster rate of imitation (i.e. proﬁts are wiped out sooner). It is clear from (22) that as long as the
rate at which values of products are discounted (r)i sg r e a t e rt h a nt h er a t ea tw h i c hp r o d u c t sa r e
created (g), an increase in ξ raises the proportion of goods produced by Southern ﬁrms (ξ)b ya
smaller fraction than it raises the discount factor at the time of imitation (ξ
r
g, which equals ξ
ρ
g+1),
so that eﬀect (a) dominates eﬀect (b), resulting in a net increase in the proﬁtr a t eo ft h em a r g i n a l
Northern ﬁrm at each date, thereby inducing more entry. It turns out that the restriction “discount
dominates growth” (r>g ), which is true in our model, is crucial to the positive slope of the NN
14curve.
Using (21), we can substitute for L
p
S in (19). Using the resulting expression, we substitute for

























nS is the instantaneous production labor input of a Southern-
produced good. The above equation is a zero proﬁt condition for a Southern imitator. The LHS is
the PDV of a stream of instantaneous proﬁts of a product imitated by a Southern ﬁrm, which is a








nS ). The RHS is the imitation
cost. Note also that wS
nS can be canceled from both sides of the equation, meaning that changes
in wS and nS have no eﬀect on the reduced form equilibrium relationship between g and ξ in the






g)=( ρ + g)ξ
λ
g (23)
where hS ≡ LS
b is Southern labor supply in terms of imitative capacity. It follows that (23)
represents a downward sloping curve in the (g,ξ) space. It is shown as curve SS in Figure 2.
Intuitively, a higher rate of innovation (while maintaining the same fraction of goods imitated by
the South) implies that more labor is allocated to imitation and less labor allocated to production of
each good, but each imitation needs more labor input. Smaller scale of production of each imitated
good, which translates into lower proﬁt for each imitated product, combined with higher labor
requirement for each act of imitation means that PDV of proﬁts from each imitation cannot cover
the cost of imitation. Therefore ξ, the fraction of goods produced by the South, must decrease so
as to increase the scale of production of each imitated variety and to reduce the cost of imitation.
This would restore the zero proﬁt condition. Thus, in the steady state, the dynamic equilibrium in
the South requires that an increase in the rate of innovation must be accompanied by a decrease
in the fraction of goods produced by the South.
3.2 Relative Wage
From equation (11), we obtain πS
πN =( wS
wN )1− . From equations (18) and (19), we obtain another
























The expression makes sense: Given that the labor allocated to innovation in North and labor
allocated to imitation in South remain constant, and the fraction of goods produced in North remain
15unchanged, an increase in LS or decrease in LN leads to a decrease in relative wage of the South.
Moreover, given LS, LN and the rate of innovation g, an autonomous increase in the fraction of
goods produced by the South ξ leads to an increase in wS/wN, as the relative demand for Southern
production labor increases, while the relative supply actually decreases due to the increased cost
of imitation, as reﬂected in the increase in ξ
λ
g.
4 Comparative Steady-states Analysis
As explained in the Introduction, we study two changes: (i) the transition from autarky to globaliza-
tion for a given (relatively small) supply of labor from the South; and (ii) deepening of globalization
caused by an increase in the supply of labor LS from the South.
4.1 From Autarky to Free Trade
We focus our discussion on the eﬀects on the North. We deﬁne autarky in the North as a situation
when it is self-suﬃcient in agricultural, traditional and diﬀerentiated goods. What does the steady
state look like under autarky in the North? Note that equations (1) through (9), (13), (20) continue
to hold, while equations (17), (18) and (20) hold by setting ξ = 0 as there is no imitation. It is
therefore clear that the steady state growth rate is obtained from equation (22) by setting ξ =0 .
With trade liberalization and imitation of some diﬀerentiated goods by the South, ξ increases. The
steady state value of ξ is dependent on LS, the extent of participation in the product cycle by the
South.
How does trade liberalization aﬀect the rate of growth of the world? From (22), we can see that
g increases as ξ increases from zero. Thus, the North grows faster with globalization of production
made possible by trade liberalization in diﬀerentiated goods and technology acquisition by the
South through imitation. What are the eﬀects of trade liberalization on the living standard of
Northern workers? We see that not only is there more variety of diﬀerentiated goods available for
consumption in the North, but the price of each good relative to Northern wage is either unchanged
(if it continues to be produced in the North) or lower (if its production is now transferred to the
South). Therefore, the living standard of each Northern worker increases from autarky to trade
liberalization.
As LS increases after trade liberalization, more goods are imitated by South, and hence global-
ization of production deepens. In the next subsection, we shall analyze the eﬀects of such a change
in depth.
164.2 Deepening of Globalization: an increase in LS
The eﬀects of changes in LS, b,a n dλ on g, ξ, ξ
λ
g and wS/wN are summarized in Table 2. Note
that ξ
λ
g is a measure of the part of imitation cost that accounts for time-cost trade-oﬀ.F r o mt h e
table, it is shown that an increase in LS leads to an increase in g, ξ and ξ
λ
g;a ni n c r e a s ei nλ raises
both g and ξ, but lowers ξ
λ
g.12 An increase of LS raises the labor requirement for the imitation of
each good in equilibrium since each good is imitated earlier in the new steady state. An increase
in λ, on the other hand, lowers the cost of imitation in equilibrium, since the cost of imitation falls
faster with time to imitate. It will be shown below that the eﬀect of LS on the cost of imitation
has crucial impact on Southern wage relative to that of the North.
In this subsection, we only explain in detail the eﬀects of LS on wS/wN,a si ti st h em o s t
interesting. In the subsection 4.4, we discuss the eﬀects of an increase in the learning capability λ
of the South.
From (24), we can deduce that there are three eﬀects of an increase in LS on wS/wN:
(I) Direct eﬀect: given g and ξ, an increase in supply of labor LS lowers wS/wN in the same
way as in Krugman (1979).
(II) Indirect eﬀect from g:a ni n c r e a s ei ng lowers the allocation of labor to production in both
the North and the South. This eﬀect is ambiguous, but when ξ
λ
g is suﬃciently small, it is negative
(i.e. an increase in g lowers wS/wN).13
(III) Indirect eﬀect from ξ:a ni n c r e a s ei nξ raises the fraction of goods produced in the South but
lowers the fraction of goods produced by the North, thereby increasing the demand for production
labor in the South and reducing the demand for production labor in the North, pushing up wS/wN.
The eﬀect becomes larger as ξ increases.
The three eﬀects are depicted in Figure 3. The solid RAp curve shows the labor allocated to










where Li = bgξ
λ
g and Ld = ag.T h es o l i dRDp curve shows the demand for production labor in the














12An increase in λ shifts SS to the right and raises g and ξ.F r o m( 2 3 ) ,s i n c eg increases, ξ
λ
g must be lower; as ξ
is larger,
λ
g must be larger to make ξ
λ
g smaller. An increase in LS shifts SS up, resulting in higher g and ξ.F r o m
(23), it is clear that ξ
λ
g must increase too.
13In the extreme case that ξ
λ
g → 0, the eﬀect of g on the denominator of (24) approaches zero.
17which follows directly from (24).
Eﬀect I shifts RAp to the right as LS increases. Eﬀect II shifts RAp to the right (left) if an
increase in g raises (lowers) LS−Li
LN−Ld, which will be true when ξ
λ
g is suﬃciently small (large). Eﬀect
III shifts RDp to the right (and its eﬀect increases with ξ).14 First of all, we shall ﬁnd the suﬃcient
condition for an increase in LS to lower wS/wN.W em a k eu s eo ft h eNN curve (22) and SS curve
(23) to substitute for the terms LN − ag and LS − bgξ
λ

















I ts h o u l db eb o r n ei nm i n dt h a tw en e e dwS/wN <α , as stated in the Wide Gap Case in section




ρ,w eo b t a i n
Result 1 For given λ>r ,i fhS is suﬃciently small relative to hN so that hS <h Nθ,t h e nwS/wN
falls as LS increases.
Proof
See the Appendix.
When LS increases, g and ξ both increase. As shown in Figure 3, eﬀe c tIa l w a y ss h i f t st h e
relative supply curve RAp to the right. Eﬀect II might shift RAp to the left or right, depending




g is suﬃciently small (which is true when hS is small), eﬀect II shifts
RAp to the right. Eﬀect III always shifts the relative demand curve RDp to the right, but its eﬀect
is small when ξ is small (which is true when hS is small). Therefore, when hS is suﬃciently small
relative to hN, the combined eﬀects of I and II dominate eﬀect III, lowering the equilibrium wS/wN,
a ss h o w ni nF i g u r e3 .
The intuition for this result is: When LS is suﬃciently small given LN, the fraction of goods
produced by South, ξ, and rate of innovation, g, are both relatively small. In this case, an increase
in LS leads to a higher percentage increase in the relative supply of labor for production (because
of the small g) than the percentage increase in the relative demand of labor for production (because
of the small ξ). Thus, relative wage wS/wN decreases.
Next, we ﬁnd the suﬃcient condition for wS/wN to increase when LS increases. Once again,











(1−ξ)2, which increases with ξ.
15We know there exist combinations of exogenous variables and parameters that satisfy this condition, because, at
the very least, we can keep hS and hN unchanged while lowering a until the RHS of (24) is less than α.
18Result 2 For given λ,i fhS is suﬃciently large relative to hN so that hS > Γ(hN,λ),t h e nwS/wN





g (an indicator of the cost of imitation) increases with LS in equilibrium, when hS is
large, ξ
λ
g is also large, so that eﬀect II shifts RAp to the left. Moreover, eﬀect III shifts RDp to the
right, and its eﬀect is suﬃciently strong when ξ is suﬃciently large. As before, eﬀect I shifts the
RAp curve to the right, but its eﬀect is (partially) oﬀset by eﬀect II, as shown in Figure 4. In this
case, the combined eﬀects of II and III dominate that of eﬀect I, raising the equilibrium wS/wN.
The intuition for this result is: When LS is suﬃciently large given LN, the fraction of goods
produced by South, ξ, and the rate of innovation, g, are both relatively large. In this case, an
increase in LS leads to a lower percentage increase in the relative supply of labor for production
(because of the large g) than the percentage increase in the relative demand of labor for production
(because of the large ξ). Thus, the relative wage wS/wN increases.
Figure 5 summarizes Results 1 and 2. For a given value of hN, starting from a point where LS













> 0. In other words, in the initial stage of globalization of production, when LS is
small, increases in LS tend to lower the relative wage of the South. As LS increases further, a point
will be reached such that increases in LS tend to raise the relative wage of the South. In the ﬁrst
zone (e.g. point A), in the initial stage of globalization, an increase in LS leads to a larger fraction
of goods being produced by the low-cost region. Therefore, the average price of goods is lower
than before, everything else being equal. In addition, Northern workers earn higher wage relative
to Southern workers. Thus, the purchasing power of their wage must increase. Moreover, the rate
of innovation is faster, making more goods available to consumers. All three factors contribute to
higher welfare for Northern workers. This is the technology transfer paradox.
However, at the later stage of globalization of production, when LS is suﬃciently large so that
the world is in the second zone (e.g. point B), increases in LS lead to a higher relative wage for the
South. By the same logic as before, it is clear that Southern workers are better oﬀ as globalization
deepens at this stage. Northern relative wage is lower. Numerical simulation, shown in Appendix
D, shows that Northern welfare continues to increase with LS initially, but it eventually declines
as globalization deepens further.
Figure 6 summarizes the non-monotonic eﬀect of an increase in LS on wS/wN. Although Results
1 and 2 only demonstrate that the curve is downward sloping when LS is small and upward sloping
19when LS is large, numerical simulation indeed shows that the curve is U-shaped and continuous
over the entire range of LS. Refer to Appendix D for the simulation results. (Appendix D is for
the beneﬁts of the referees only, and is not intended to be published for the sake of space.)
4.3 Welfare analysis of deepening of globalization
Deﬁning EN as the total Northern consumption expenditure at a certain date τ, and making use
of (3), (5), (9), (10), we obtain aggregate Northern instantaneous utility at date τ (where the time








































noting that   =1 /(1 − α).
Total instantaneous factor income in the North is equal to wNLN +(n − nS)πN; total instanta-
neous investment expenditure in the North is equal to wNag. Trade balance implies that investment
expenditure plus consumption expenditure must be equal to total income in the North. Therefore,
we have
wNag + EN = wNLN +( n − nS)πN
=⇒ EN = wN (LN − ag)+( n − nS)πN








wN (LN − ag)
Since all Northern workers are identical, Northern consumption expenditure per Northern






















Note that UN = LNuN because U is homogeneous of degree one in the vector of consumption of
goods in equation (3).
















From (1), we know that welfare of each Northern worker at date 0, which can be any starting





In steady state, noting that n(τ)=n(0)egτ,w h i l eξ, wS





































































































With the help of equations (26) and (27), we can evaluate the eﬀects of changes in LS on the
steady state welfare of the North and of the South. Using numerical simulation, the result of which
is contained in Appendix D and Figure 6, we show that steady state ωN increases in the initial
stage of deepening of globalization as predicted. Steady state ωN continues to climb even as wN
wS
falls in response to increases in LS in the later stage of globalization, apparently because the eﬀects
of increases in ξ and g dominate that of decreases in wN
wS . But Northern welfare peaks out at some
level of LS, and begins to fall as LS increases further. This is the point when the eﬀect of wN
wS begins
to dominate those of ξ and g. Refer to Appendix D and Figure 6. This non-monotonic eﬀect on
Northern welfare as the South expands bears some resemblance to the ﬁnding of Samuelson (2004):
When the South has already imitated a large fraction of goods developed by the North, any further
increase in the fraction will hurt the North.
As expected, the trend of steady state ωS is just opposite of that of ωN. In the initial stage
of globalization, ωS ﬁrst falls with LS, apparently because the eﬀect of wS
wN dominates those of ξ
21and g. But Southern welfare per worker reaches a trough at a point where wS
wN is still decreasing,
apparently because the eﬀects of increases in g and ξ begin to dominate that of decreases in wS
wN .
Not surprisingly, steady state ωS continues to climb with LS as wS
wN rises with LS in the later stage
of globalization. See Figure 6 and Appendix D.
4.4 Increase in learning capability of South
We can think of the increase in λ as an increase in the learning capability of the South in the sense
that they learn to imitate faster, or that the learning curve is steeper.
Result 3 An increase in λ leads to increases in g, ξ and wS/wN.
Proof
From the results in Table 2, an increase in λ leads to increases in g and ξ but a decrease in ξ
λ
g.
(See also footnote 12 for the derivation.) From (25), it follows that wS/wN increases unambiguously
¥
The intuition is: An increase in λ lowers ξ
λ
g, a component of the cost of imitation that depends
on the time to imitate. Hence, Southern ﬁrms imitate more goods at each date, and ξ increases.
Since an increase in ξ encourages more ﬁrms in the North to innovate, g also increases, according
to (22). Moreover, since λ
g also increases (according to footnote 12), we conclude from (25) that
eﬀect II is always dominated by eﬀect III, leading to an increase in wS/wN.( T h e r ei sn oe ﬀect I.)
Therefore, an increase in the fraction of goods produced by the South through an improvement
in the imitative capability of the South rather than an increase in the supply of labor would
unambiguously increase the relative wage of the South, and thus improve the welfare of the Southern
workers. The North, though, may or may not gain as a result.
Let us summarize our main results. Analyzed from the perspective of product cycle theory,
globalization of production resulting from trade liberalization between the North and the South
and imitation of Northern technology by the South would increase growth of the North. In the
initial stage of globalization of production, deeper globalization unambiguously improves the welfare
of labor in the North. This is the technology transfer paradox. In the later stage of production
globalization, deeper globalization of production unambiguously improves the welfare of labor in the
South. Northern workers would eventually lose from deepening of globalization. Such contrasting
results for the North obtain because an increase in the supply of Southern labor that participates
in the product cycle has a non-monotonic impact on the wage of Southern labor relative to that of
the North. Refer to Figure 6.
22There are two reasons for the existence of technology transfer paradox in our paper. First, a
deepening of globalization of production leads to a higher fraction of diﬀerentiated goods being
produced by the South, which in turn leads to higher rate of product innovation, making more
goods available to Northern (as well as Southern) workers. The rate of innovation increases because
production is transferred more quickly to the South, leaving more resources for each Northern ﬁrm
to expand production and earn higher proﬁt rate at each date, inducing more entry into innovation.
Second, when the fraction of goods produced by the South is relatively small, a deepening of
globalization boosts the relative supply of Southern production labor more than it boosts the
relative demand of Southern production labor, leaving the relative wage of the South lower. This
increases the purchasing power of Northern workers.
In Jones and Ruﬃn (forthcoming), however, the paradox arises because there is a drastic change
in comparative advantage of the good whose technology is transferred to the South, turning the
North from an exporter to an importer of that good. Their model and ours share the same feature
that the North turns from an exporter to an importer after the technology transfer. Our model
has the added feature that some of the resources released in the North now go to R&D, boosting
the rate of innovation. Their paradox requires that the countries share the same Cobb-Douglas
preferences, whereas our paradox holds for CES preferences. In this sense, the condition for our
paradox is a little more general.
5 Conclusion and Caveats
Analyzed from the perspective of product cycle theory, globalization of production resulting from
trade liberalization between the North and the South and imitation of Northern technology by
the South would increase the rate of innovation and growth of the North. However, deepening
of globalization of production can lead to a non-monotonic eﬀect on the wage of Southern labor
relative to that of the North since Southern labor requirement for imitating a product increases
endogenously as globalization of production deepens. This in turn leads to non-monotonic eﬀects
on the welfare of Northern and Southern workers.
In the initial stage of globalization, the deepening of globalization of production lowers the
relative wage of the South. Thus, the North’s labor unambiguously gains from deeper globalization
due to the increase in the purchasing power of its wage as well as from the faster rate of innovation.
This is the technology transfer paradox: An increase in the extent of uncompensated technology
transfers from the North to the South makes the North better oﬀ. Eventually, however, as South’s
supply of labor in the product cycle gets suﬃciently large, deepening of globalization causes the
relative wage of South to increase. For this reason, a point will be reached where deepening
23to reduce Northern welfare. This result bears some resemblance to that of Samuelson (2004), who
conjectures that the North would ﬁrst gain but eventually lose from uncompensated technology
transfer to the South as the transfer intensiﬁes.
In any case, Southern workers necessarily gain from improvement of the South’s speed of imi-
tation through an increase in their learning capability, as this unambiguously increases their wage
relative to that of the North as well as enhances the rate of innovation.
For further research, we can model the situation when the North is compensated for the tech-
nology transfer to the South. This can be done by assuming that production is transferred through
FDI or outsourcing. Another direction for extension may be to endogenize a Southern ﬁrm’s deci-
sion as to whether to imitate or innovate a product, possibly assuming the capability to innovate
depends positively on the experience in imitation. It will be interesting to see how our results
change with these modiﬁcations.
24Appendix
A Proof that NN is upward sloping
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g}. Deﬁne the expression inside the curly brackets as h(ξ,g). Thus,
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g−1 , which is less than zero since ξ<1. Therefore, h(ξ,g)
increases as ξ decreases, for any given g. Accordingly, as long as 0 <ξ<1, it must be true that





∂ξ > 0 for any given g,a sl o n ga s
0 <ξ<1.
B Proof of Result 1
From equation (22), we see that g increases as ξ increases in order to maintain Northern market
equilibrium. Therefore, ξ =0a n dξ → 1d e ﬁne the lower and upper limit, respectively, of the value
that g can take in the steady state. It can be shown that the minimum g is found from setting
ξ = 0 in (22) and solving for g: gmin =( 1− α)hN − αρ.T h em a x i m u mg is found from solving for
g in (22) as ξ → 1: gmax =( 1− α)hN.
From Figure 2, an increase in LS raises both g and ξ. Therefore, the suﬃcient conditions for wS
wN
to decrease as LS increases are (a) ∂RHS
∂ξ < 0a n d( b )∂RHS
∂g < 0 in equation (25). The necessary












It is clear that the ﬁrst of the above conditions implies the second one. A necessary condition for
the ﬁrst inequality to hold is λ>g .O f c o u r s e , hN has to be suﬃciently small relative to λ to
ensure λ>gand a suﬃcient condition for this is λ − gmax > 0. This is true iﬀ hN <λ ( 1
1−α).
It is shown below that hS
hN =( ξ
λ
g)max: From (23), 1−α
α (hS − gξ
λ
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C Proof of Result 2
Since an increase in LS raises both g and ξ,t h es u ﬃcient condition for wS
wN to increase are (a)
∂RHS
∂ξ > 0a n d( b )∂RHS
∂g > 0 in equation (25). It turns out that the necessary and suﬃcient
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Again, if hN <λ ( 1
1−α)t h e nλ>g .T h e r e f o r e ,












(This appendix is not intended to be published.) I use the Goal Seek routine in Microsoft Excel
to simulate the model in this paper. The simulation helps me to conﬁrm that (a) wS/wN is U-
shaped when plotted against LS on the horizontal axis; (b) ωN (called “W N per wkr” in the Excel
worksheet) is an inverted U when plotted against LS, and the curve reaches a peak after the curve
of wS/wN (called “wS/wN” in the Excel worksheet) reaches its trough; (c) ωS (called “W Sp e r
wkr” in the Excel worksheet) is U-shaped when plotted against LS, and it reaches its trough before
the curve of wS/wN reaches its trough.
In the simulation, we set α =0 .7, a = 25, b = 2000, ρ =0 .05, λ =0 .5, LN = 20, and LS ranges
from 10 to 1690. Athough b is much larger than a, L
p
S/LS is equal to about 0.7 throughout the
range of LS,w h i l eL
p
N/LN is also about 0.7 throughout the range of LS. Note that the values of A,
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α 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
a 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
b 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000
ρ 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
λ 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Exogenous
Variables:
LN 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
LS 10 15 20 25 30 35 125 215 305 395 485
hS 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.11 0.15 0.20 0.24
hN 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Endogenous
Variables:
ξ 0.112332 0.131885 0.147920 0.161727 0.174014 0.185153 0.310649 0.389309 0.451293 0.504039 0.550737
Goal Seek: 0.00006022 -0.00001644 0.00000668 0.00002372 0.00006148 0.00009347 0.00003022 0.00001390 0.00000701 0.00000347 0.00000145
g 0.21386 0.21503 0.21588 0.21658 0.21717 0.21768 0.22297 0.22570 0.22764 0.22916 0.23043
wS/wN 0.65963 0.61668 0.58856 0.56799 0.55199 0.53902 0.45074 0.42454 0.41225 0.40620 0.40380
A 2.578 3.870 5.163 6.457 7.751 9.046 32.412 55.841 79.306 102.799 126.314
B 1987.945 1982.002 1976.084 1970.188 1964.309 1958.446 1854.634 1752.593 1651.613 1551.412 1451.831
C 7.422 11.130 14.837 18.543 22.249 25.954 92.588 159.159 225.694 292.201 358.686
D 14.653 14.624 14.603 14.586 14.571 14.558 14.426 14.357 14.309 14.271 14.239
E 0.040 0.083 0.111 0.132 0.148 0.161 0.249 0.275 0.288 0.294 0.296
F 0.169 0.243 0.309 0.367 0.420 0.469 0.987 1.248 1.415 1.531 1.613
G -0.802 -0.885 -0.928 -0.953 -0.966 -0.973 -0.872 -0.751 -0.653 -0.572 -0.503
W_N per wkr 31.891 32.687 33.363 33.960 34.495 34.983 40.150 42.763 44.456 45.654 46.535
W_S per wkr 23.827 23.311 23.080 22.986 22.967 22.994 24.744 26.243 27.408 28.357 29.159
W_S trough wS/wN
troughParameters:
0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 α
25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 a
2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 b
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 ρ
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 λ
Exogenous
Variables:
20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 LN
575 665 755 845 935 1025 1115 1205 1295 1690 LS
0.29 0.33 0.38 0.42 0.47 0.51 0.56 0.60 0.65 0.85 hS
0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 hN
Endogenous
Variables:
0.593094 0.632146 0.668579 0.702870 0.735370 0.766345 0.795999 0.824498 0.849210 0.962798 ξ
0.00000021 -0.00000058 -0.00000111 -0.00000146 -0.00000171 -0.00000187 -0.00000199 -0.00000206 -0.00237351 -0.00008468 Goal Seek:
0.23152 0.23248 0.23334 0.23413 0.23485 0.23551 0.23613 0.23671 0.23860 0.23939 g
0.40394 0.40610 0.41002 0.41565 0.42303 0.43237 0.44401 0.45851 0.47336 0.69031 wS/wN
149.847 173.395 196.958 220.532 244.118 267.714 291.320 314.934 338.801 442.329 A
1352.770 1254.156 1155.937 1058.070 960.522 863.267 766.282 669.546 580.039 152.259 B
425.153 491.605 558.042 624.468 690.882 757.286 823.680 890.066 956.199 1247.671 C
14.212 14.188 14.166 14.147 14.129 14.112 14.097 14.082 14.035 14.015 D
0.296 0.294 0.290 0.284 0.277 0.268 0.256 0.241 0.227 0.010 E
1.672 1.713 1.738 1.749 1.747 1.733 1.704 1.660 1.612 0.843 F
-0.443 -0.390 -0.343 -0.300 -0.260 -0.224 -0.190 -0.159 -0.133 -0.022 G
47.190 47.668 48.000 48.203 48.285 48.250 48.091 47.795 47.638 41.152 W_N per worke
29.855 30.469 31.020 31.520 31.978 32.400 32.792 33.157 33.697 34.783 W_S per wkr
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Table 1: Output of Major Industrial Products from China 
 
  Actual Production In: 
  1978 2005  unit 
Output in 2005 / 
Output in 1978 
Chemical Fiber  284,600  16.6 mn tons  58.3
Yarn    2.4 mn  14.5 mn  tons  6.0
Cloth  11.0 bn   48.4 bn  mtrs  4.4
Silk    29,700   111,000  tons  3.7
Paper    4.4 mn   62.1 mn  tons  14.1
Plastics  679,000   23.1 mn  tons  34.0
Sugar    2.3 mn     9.1 mn  tons  4.0
Beer  400,000   31.3 mn  tons  78.3
Cigarettes  11.8 mn  193.9 mn  cases  16.4
Refrigerators    28,000   29.9 mn  units  1,068
Room ACs  200   67.6 mn  units  338,000
Washing Machines         400   30.4 mn  units  76,000
Color TVs      3,800   82.8 mn  units  21,789
Motor Vehicles  149,100     5.7 mn  units  38.2
Electricity  257.6 mn  2,500.3 mn  1000 kwh  9.7
Crude Oil  104.1 mn     181.4 mn   tons  1.7
Coal  618.0 mn  2,205.0 mn   tons  3.6
Natural Gas    13.7 mn       50.9 mn  1000 cu.m  3.7
Hydropower    44.6 mn     397.0 mn  1000 kwh  8.9
Pig Iron    34.8 mn     343.8 mn   tons  9.9
Steel    31.8 mn     353.2 mn   tons  11.1
Steel Products    22.1 mn     377.7 mn   tons  17.1
Cement    65.2 mn  1,068.8 mn    tons  16.4
Plate Glass     17.8 mn     402.1 mn   wt. cases  22.6
Sulfuric Acid      6.6 mn       45.4 mn   tons  6.9
Chemical Fertilizer  8.7 mn       51.8 mn   tons  6.0
Microcomputers  0      80.8 mn  units  N/A
Integrated Circuits  30.4 mn  26,997.3  mn   units  888
Mobile Phones  0    303.5 mn  units  N/A
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2007 China Statistical Yearbook, China Statistics 




LS ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ or ↑
b ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
λ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑
↑ indicates an increase
↓ indicates a decrease
LS is South’s supply of labor
b is Imitation labor requirement parameter
λ is Time vs. imitation-cost trade-oﬀ rate
g is Growth rate
ξ is N-S Technology gap
ξ
λ
g is Time-dependent component of Imitation cost
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d t   s t
Present Discounted Value of  S V  
) , ( t z Ci
Time t 
Figure 1. The determination of the date of imitation of a good. 
 
Note: ) , ( t z Ci  is the cost of completing the imitation of  good z at date t 
when the good is developed at date  d t . In equilibrium, the good is 
imitated at date  s t , when the profit of the imitator is driven to zero due 
to free entry into the imitation business.   37
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innovation g 
Fraction of goods produced  
by the South  ξ  
* ξ  
* g
0 
Figure 2. Equilibrium values of  g and ξ .  
 
Note: An increase in  S L  shifts the SS curve up and increases g and ξ , but the 
magnitude of g is bounded from above by  N h ) 1 ( α − . 
N h ) 1 ( α −
↑ S L  38
 
Relative wage of 
the South N s w w / 
0  Labor allocated to 
production in the South 





s L L / 




s L L L L − −
Figure 3. Effects of an increase in Southern labor allocation 
when  S L  is small. 
 
Note: These are the effects of an increase in  S L  when  θ N s h h < . 
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p RD  39
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Figure 4. Effects of an increase in Southern labor 
allocation when  S L  is large. 
 
Note: These are the effects of an increase in  S L when Γ > s h . 
p RD
Labor allocated to 
production in the South 
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Figure 5. The non-monotonic effect of  S L  on N S w w / .  
 
Note: For given value of  N h , as  S h  increases so that the world moves from point A to 



























Deepening of globalization 
Initial stage of globalization Later stage of globalization 
S L
N ω  
Figure 6. Non-monotonic effect of deepening of globalization and stages of globalization. 
 
S ω  